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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The Supreme 
Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme 
Court has original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee Farmers Insurance Group's 
(Farmers) motion for summary judgment for the reason: 
a. The Utah Uninsured Motorist (UIM) Statute (U.C.A. §31A-22-305) is 
ambiguous and cannot be interpreted in manner consistent with other portions of the UIM 
statute; 
b. The Utah UIM statute is unconstitutional in that it deprives Appellant 
Charisse Phillips (Phillips) of full recovery for her injuries and deprives her of the benefit 
which paying UIM premiums affords; 
c. The underinsured portion of Farmers' policy, entered into between Farmers 
and Phillips violates Utah's public policy of ensuring full recovery for accident victims; 
and 
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d. Utah should adopt standards recognized by the State of Arizona and other 
states in allowing intra-policy coverage by combining the liability and UIM portions of 
automobile insurance policies. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented hereinabove come before this court on review of the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Farmers. On review, this court 
view's the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, with no deference to the trial court's decision. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Green. 89 P.3d 97, 99 (Utah 2003), citing 
Arnold Indus, v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
On appeal the issues raised by Phillips are those addressed in the Phillips' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Framers' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV §1: 
§1 All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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Utah Constitution Article 1 §7: 
§7 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(c))(2000): 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(c)) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless 
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31 A-22-305(9)(c)). 
U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000) a true and correct copy of which is attached in the 
addendum hereto. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(8)(b)(I) (2000): 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(I) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same 
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a)(2000): 
(10)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle 
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a resident spouse, or 
resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under 
which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes underinsured 
motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist benefits from any other 
motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is named insured. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Farmers. On or about 16 October 2000 Phillips was seriously injured in an automobile 
accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband. Farmers paid 
Phillips the maximum liability coverage she was entitled to receive under the policy held 
by Phillips. However, the amount paid was insufficient to cover expenses associated 
with Phillips5 injuries. Consequently, Phillips filed this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment entitling her to recover UIM benefits under the policy. 
For purposes of Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties entered into 
a stipulation of facts, a true and correct copy of which is attached in the addendum 
hereto. The trial court ruled, based on the parties' stipulation of facts, the terms and 
conditions of the Farmers' policy and Utah law, Phillips was precluded from recovering 
UIM benefits. 
A true and correct copy of the trial court's decision regarding Farmers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (as found in the trial court record, pages 97-99) is attached in the 
Addendum hereto. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts constitute a verbatim recitation of the facts which the parties 
stipulated to for purposes of Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment (Stipulation of 
Facts for Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 51-54): 
L On or about October 16, 2000, on 1-80 near Tooele, Utah, the Plaintiff, 
Charisse Phillips, was riding as a passenger in a 1997 Jeep Cherokee automobile driven 
by her husband, Bart C. Phillips, when the Jeep Cherokee automobile collided with 
another vehicle and then rolled over. 
2. The accident resulted in injures to Charisse Phillips, for which Ms. Phillips 
claims damages in excess of $100,000.00. 
3. Charisse Phillips claims that the accident was caused by negligence of her 
husband, Bart C. Phillips in the manner in which he operated the Jeep Cherokee 
automobile at the time of the accident. 
4. The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of 
the accident was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Defendant, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. The named insured under the policy was Charisse Phillips. 
5. The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy provided automobile liability 
insurance coverage for Bart C. Phillips with limits of $50,000.00. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange has paid the limits of $50,000 to Charisse Phillips, in exchange for a release of 
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all her claims against Bart C. Phillips. The Release specifically reserves all claims, if 
any, which Charisse Phillips may have against Farmers Insurance Exchange for 
underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the accident. 
6. The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy also includes underinsured 
motorist coverage with limits of $50,000. The underinsured motorist provisions of the 
policy include the following: 
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which 
an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages 
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor 
vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured 
person while occupying your insured car. 
7. The underinsured motorist coverage of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy 
contains the following provision: 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
a. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
b. Furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family 
member; 
* * * 
8. The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of 
the accident was the same vehicle which was insured under the liability coverage of the 
Farmers Insurance Exchange policy. The vehicle also was furnished or available both for 
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the regular use of Charisse Phillips and her husband, Bart C. Phillips, who is a "family 
member" under the terms of the Farmers Insurance policy. 
9. Charisse Phillips has made a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under 
the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy. Farmers Insurance Exchange has denied 
coverage based on the provisions of the policy quoted above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE 1 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers was not 
appropriate. Under Utah's UIM statute, automobile insurers are required to provide 
purchasers with UIM coverage unless such coverage is waived in writing by the 
purchaser. In this matter, Phillips did not waive UIM coverage and in fact purchased 
$50,000 of UIM protection under her policy. 
Subsequently, Phillips was severely injured in a vehicle accident while traveling 
as a passenger in an automobile insured under her policy and driven by her spouse. The 
cause of the accident was attributed to Phillips' spouse. While Phillips recovered under 
the liability portion of her policy, the amount she recovered was insufficient to cover 
costs associated with her injuries. Consequently, she filed this action to recover under 
the UIM portion of her policy. On Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, Phillips 
action was denied under U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000) on the grounds that the Farmers' 
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policy exclusion, which the court found prohibited Phillips recovery, was specifically 
authorized under the UIM statute. 
Phillips appeals the trial court's decision on grounds that the portion of the UIM 
statute the trial court relied on in granting Farmers summary judgment, conflicts with 
cannot be harmonized with other portions of the statute which mandate access to UIM 
coverage. 
ISSUE 2 
Phillips entered into a contract with Farmers for UIM coverage. After being 
injured in an accident, she attempted to recover UIM benefits under her policy. Phillips 
was denied UIM coverage on the grounds that the UIM policy she was trying to recover 
under was the same policy through which she obtained liability coverage for injuries 
attributed to the negligence of her spouse, who was the driver of the vehicle Phillips was 
riding in at the time of the injury. But for state statutes which purport to authorize UIM 
coverage exclusions, such as that under which Phillips was denied UIM benefits, Phillips 
would be entitled to recover insurance proceeds she contracted for and paid to receive. 
The statutory exclusion which was the basis for denying Phillips UIM benefits 
constitutes a violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 §7 of 
the Utah Constitution. These constitutional provisions prohibit state action which 
deprive citizens of their property without due process of law. Phillips held a property 
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interest in the UIM coverage she purchased and the unilateral actions of the legislature 
denied her the benefit of her property interest at a time of critical need. 
ISSUE 3 
Utah courts have recognized a long standing public policy favoring the recovery 
of insurance proceeds, by eligible injured parties. In this matter, Phillips entered into an 
agreement with Farmers to purchase UIM coverage. She paid for the coverage and 
subsequently attempted to recover under her policy, for injuries she sustained, through no 
fault of her own, in an automobile accident. 
Phillips and most other purchasers of retail automobile insurance coverage are 
effectively powerless to negotiate terms and conditions with larger insurance companies. 
Coverage is provided on a take it or leave it basis. Consequently, policy exclusions are 
subject to the whims of insurers and the state legislature who collude in attempts to 
regulate coverage availability. As a result, for consumers, such as Phillips, insurance 
policies are the ultimate examples of adhesion contracts. 
In this matter, Farmers' through its policy exclusions denied Phillips UIM benefits 
she purchased and paid for. Farmers' policy exclusions violate Utah's public policy of 
fostering responsible insurance coverage and promoting access to such coverage by 
those who purchase insurance, when unfortunate occasions arise. This court should deny 
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recognition of policy exclusions, such as those relied on by Farmers in withholding 
Phillips' UIM benefits, on the grounds that Farmers' exclusions violate public policy. 
ISSUE 4 
The courts of Arizona, Hawaii, Washington and New Mexico have determined 
that insurers should not be able to exclude otherwise eligible consumers from access to 
UIM benefits based on policy exclusions. For instance, Arizona's court has focused on 
whether the risks which parties seek to insure against constitute separate risks, e.g., 
purchasers of UIM coverage who seek to insure against accidental injuries caused by 
negligent parties who lack assets or sufficient insurance coverage. If so, then public 
policy dictates that insureds have access to purchased coverages, when accidents expose 
insureds to the anticipated risks for which insurance was obtained. 
In this matter, Phillips was severely injured in an automobile accident. She was a 
passenger in a vehicle driven by her spouse. The vehicle was insured under a policy 
owned by Phillips. Her spouse was insured as the guest driver of the vehicle under 
Phillips' policy. As a result of her spouse's negligence, Phillips recovered under the 
liability portion of her policy. However, the liability limits were insufficient to cover the 
costs associated with the injuries Phillips sustained. As a result Phillips attempted to 
recover additional benefits under the UIM coverage she purchased from Farmers. 
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However, Phillips recovery of UIM benefits was denied based on statutory policy 
exclusions. 
Under the analysis of courts in other states, policy exclusions, such as those used 
to deny Phillips UIM benefits, have been found violative of policy favoring recovery for 
insured risks. Likewise, this court should adopt similar analysis and hold Farmers policy 
exclusions void in favor of promoting recovery by injured parties, through insurance 
policies purchased for the purpose of covering foreseeable risks. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 1 
THE UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST (UIM) STATUTE 
(U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000)) IS AMBIGUOUS AND CANNOT 
BE INTERPRETED IN MANNER CONSISTENT WITH 
OTHER PORTIONS OF THE UIM STATUTE 
In granting Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court relied on the 
provisions of Farmers' policy, Part II(c))(l) of its policy pertaining to under insured 
motorist (UIM) coverage, in denying Phillips' recovery. The court found the provisions 
of the policy clearly and unambiguously precluded Phillips from obtaining UIM. As 
noted in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts hereinabove, the relevant provision 
provides: 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
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(b) furnished or available for the regular used of you or any family 
member; 
However, the court's decision ignores provisions Utah law in effect at the time of 
the accident, which also govern Phillips' right of recovery. In particular, at the time of 
the accident, U.C.A. section 31A-22-305(10)(a) provided: 
Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular 
use of the insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, 
only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim 
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement 
vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in 
this Subsection (10) a covered person injured in a vehicle described in 
a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to 
collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor 
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a named insured. 
This section of the statute applies to Phillips. She was physically injured while 
occupying a motor vehicle she owned and available for her regular use as the insured. 
The motor vehicle in which she was traveling is described in the policy under which her 
claim is made. Phillips was injured in a vehicle described in a policy that contained 
underinsured motorist benefits, however, her recovery is confined by the aforementioned 
statute solely to the UIM policy of that covered motor vehicle in which the accident took 
place. She is barred by the statute from collecting the UIM from any other "motor 
vehicle insurance policy under which she is a named insured." 
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While Phillips is confined by U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a) to collecting UIM 
through the policy in place against the 1997 Jeep Cherokee Mr. Phillips was driving, 
U.C.A. §31 A-22-305 (8)(b)(I) prevents her recovery under that policy. As noted in Point 
II of Farmers' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, §31A-22-
305(8)(b)(I) is the basis for the provision in its policy by which it denied Phillips' UIM 
recovery. However, together U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a) and U.C.A. §31 A-22-305 
(8)(b)(I) create an obvious ambiguity. Section (8)(b)(I) of the statute prevents recovery 
while (10)(a) makes recovery available solely from the UIM policy of the vehicle 
occupied by the insured when the accident occurred. 
In reviewing insurance contracts, it is a settled principle of Utah law that 
u
 insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance. " USF&G v. 
Sandt, 854 P2. 519, 521 (Utah 1993) citing Richards v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 200 P. 
1017, 1020 (1921). In the instant case the ambiguity which forms the basis of Phillips' 
arises out of the policy and underlying legislation by which the terms of the policy are 
mandated. As a result, the policy cannot be separated from the statute. The purpose and 
intent of UIM is to provide coverage for victims, where liability coverage provided by a 
negligent perpetrator is otherwise insufficient to cover the full cost of a victim's injuries, 
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(9)(a). 
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U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(C) (1953 - 2000) mandated UIM coverage under U.C.A. 
§31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived. Consequently, the terms of the Farmers' 
policy are bound by all of the requirements of s §31A-22-305. The reading of section 
31A-22-305(10)(a) and 31A-22-305(8)(b)(I), in conjunction with §31A-22-302 (2000), 
creates an outcome that is difficult to reconcile. 
It appears the legislature was attempting to prohibit intra-policy stacking, as that 
term is described in $tate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green. 89 P.3d 97, 105 (Utah 
2003), and which the Green court indicated (in dictum) would not be allowed. However, 
Phillips is not trying to stack multiple UIM coverages. She is simply requesting the 
benefit of coverage she paid for under one policy. 
According to (8)(b)(I) the underinsured motor vehicle cannot be the same vehicle 
that is covered by the liability portion of the policy, however section (10)(a) allows 
recovery to the insured who is injured in a motor vehicle owned by the insured which 
produces the following absurd result: the insured could only recover damages if he or 
she had UIM coverage solely and not liability coverage, which is a violation of Utah law 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-302 (2000). The combination of these sections of the Utah Code 
produce, as stated, an inconsistent result and also prevent innocent victims from full 
recovery. 
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Accordingly, the requirements of U.C.A. §31A-22-302, §31A-22-305 and 
Farmers' policy should be harmonized to allow Phillips recovery under her UIM 
coverage. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 2 
THE UTAH UIM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
THAT IT DEPRIVES APPELLANT CHARISSE PHILLIPS 
(PHILLIPS) OF FULL RECOVERY FOR HER INJURIES 
AND DEPRIVES HER OF THE BENEFIT WHICH PAYING 
UIM PREMIUMS AFFORDS 
Phillips paid the premiums under her UIM coverage and she was injured in a 
motor vehicle that provided UIM coverage. If she is denied the right to recover for her 
injuries in excess of the liability coverage on the Jeep Cherokee she will be denied the 
reasonable value of the UIM coverage she purchased. This deprivation constitutes a 
violation of her substantive due process rights, in particular her property rights under 
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
Both Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution make it clear "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." Article I § 7 Utah Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 
2. Phillips has paid for the benefit of UIM coverage, which is being taken away by state 
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action, through the Utah UIM statute and is thereby being deprived of her property 
interest in the UIM coverage. 
It is a well-recognized principal that in order to invoke the protection of the 14th 
Amendment the plaintiff must show state action. Johnson v. Rodrigues 293 F.3d 1196 
(Utah 2002). In this matter, state action lies in the statutes prohibition of recovery. 
Phillips is hereby deprived of the benefit of UIM coverage she paid for. Mahone v. 
Addicks UtiL Dist. 836 F.2d 921, 929 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that, at a minimum, 
"property interest" as defined in the Fourteenth Amendment includes both real and 
personal property). 
Utah's UIM statute constitutes a violation of Phillips' constitutional rights in that 
she is deprived of her property interest in the UIM premiums she paid for. The premiums 
were paid in order insure Phillips against foreseeable accidental risks. Therefore, the 
UIM statute should be declared unconstitutional by this court. In so doing, this action 
will allow innocent accident victims appropriate recovery under their UIM policy 
coverages. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 3 
THE UNDERINSURED PORTION OF FARMERS' POLICY, 
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN FARMERS AND PHILLIPS 
VIOLATES UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY OF ENSURING 
FULL RECOVERY FOR ACCIDENT VICTIMS 
18 
In the alternative to arguments presented hereinabove, if this court determines that 
Utah's UIM statute in place at the time of Phillips' accident (U.C.A. §31A-22-305 
(2000)) and Farmers' policy deny her recovery of UIM benefits, then Phillips requests 
the court find this denial constitutes a violation of Utah's public policy. Phillips entered 
into a motor vehicle insurance policy with Farmers. The policy provides UIM coverage 
and Phillips made premium payments for the UIM coverage. 
The trial court held the UIM portion of Phillips' policy, which mirrors Utah Code 
section 31A-22-305 (8)(b)(I), prevents recovery from both the liability coverage and the 
UIM coverage if the motor vehicle on which the claim is made is also covered under the 
liability provision of the same policy. In its order the on summary judgment (page 1), the 
trial court noted the applicable provision as follows: 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy. 
(b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family 
member;... 
If the trial court's decision is upheld, this exclusion bars recovery to policy 
owners, like Phillips, who are injured as a result of others' negligence, but who are 
required to look solely to the liability portion of their policies for recovery. Phillips did 
not cause the accident and even though she has paid UIM premiums, she is denied 
19 
recovery under her UIM policy for that portion of her loses which exceeded the liability 
coverage she was entitled to. Utah law recognizes UIM coverage as a source for the 
innocent victim to receive full recovery in an accident: 
Underinsured motorist coverage provides first-party insurance 
protection for damages that exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily 
injury coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage is a facet of 
uninsured motorist coverage; its purpose is to provide insurance 
protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent 
motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in the amount of 
the underinsured policy. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 
519, 521 (Utah 1993). 
It should not matter that Phillips's husband was the tortfeasor, she should be able 
to recover for the damages suffered because of her husband's negligence. "Since 1921 
this Court [the Utah Supreme Court] has expressed its commitment to the principle that 
insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance" Richards v. 
Standard Ace. Ins. Co.. 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 1020 (1921); Colovos v. Home Life 
Ins. Co.. 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607, 610 (1934); see also Browning v. Equitable Life 
Assur. S o c 94 Utah 570, 80 P.2d 348, 352 (1938) [hereinafter Browning II ] ("In 
construing a policy of life insurance, that interpretation is to be placed upon the words of 
the policy which is most favorable to the insured."). 
20 
This fundamental rule is based on the fact that an insurance policy is a classic 
example of an adhesion contract. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 
(1993). The Utah Supreme Court has maintained this ideology regarding interpretation of 
insurance contracts for many years: "Thirty years after Browning I this Court reaffirmed 
the proposition that insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer 
and in favor of the insured..." DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 147, 150, 442 
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1968). In DiEnes, the Court, relying on Browning I, characterized 
this position as "ftjhe rule for interpreting an insurance policy " Id. at 150, 442 P.2d at 
471. In Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 135, 442 P.2d 26, 28 
(Utah 1968), the Court reiterated this rule, stating, "We have heretofore held that the 
insured is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the 
policy." (Emphasis added.) See also P.E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 164,406 
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965), where the Court stated, "[T]he insured is entitled to the 
broadest protection that he could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning 
of its terms afforded him." U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (1993). 
For this reason the rule of strictissimi juris has been applied almost universally to 
insurance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, requires liberal construction 
in favor of the insured, to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was purchased. 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (1937) 
21 
(Larson, J., concurring in part, joined by Folland, C.J., Hanson, J., and Moffat, J.) 
[hereinafter Browning I ] (emphasis added); see also Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc., 84 Utah 452, 36 P.2d 105, 109 (1934). 
Farmers, through its adhesion contract, attempts to defeat the purpose of insurance 
by preventing an innocent victim from fully recovering her damages. Therefore, this 
Court should interpret the Farmers' policy liberally and declare because Phillips cannot 
recover the full amount of her damages under the liability policy, she should be allowed 
additional recovery through the UIM portion of her policy. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 4 
UTAH SHOULD ADOPT STANDARDS RECOGNIZED BY 
THE STATE OF ARIZONA AND OTHER STATES IN 
ALLOWING INTRA-POLICY COVERAGE BY COMBINING 
THE LIABILITY AND UIM PORTIONS OF 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES 
Arizona recognizes intra-policy coverage of liability and UIM for the benefit of 
the named insured. See Taylor v. Travelers Indem. Co. of America, 9 P.2d 1049 (Ariz. 
2000). In Taylor, the named insured, Mr. Taylor, caused an accident. He was killed and 
four other people were injured. IdL at 1051. Mr. Taylor's insurance provider paid out the 
$300,000 the liability limit of the policy to the four injured persons. Id. One of the 
injured persons was Nellie Taylor, Mr. Taylor's wife. Id. Mrs. Taylor received $183, 
500 for her injuries, an amount much less than her medical bills. Id Mrs. Taylor made a 
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claim against her insurer for the UIM portion of her and her husband's policy, which 
was denied. Id, Travelers argued that statute and case law prevented Nellie Taylor from 
combining her UIM and liability coverages. 
The Arizona Supreme Court found that Mrs. Taylor was not precluded by statute 
nor by case law from combining her UIM coverage and liability coverage. The Arizona 
Supreme Court found that "[i]ntra-policy setoff provisions limiting an insurer's exposure 
violate the statute: 'the insured purchased coverage against separate risks; if more than 
one of these risks occur, public policy dictates that the insured receive the coverage she 
has purchased, which would be coverage for each risk.'" Taylor at 1055. See also Diane 
Mihalsky, Duran v. Hartford Ins. Co.: When is an Insured Under insured?\ 22 ARIZ. ST. 
LJ. 493, 522-23 (1990). 
In Taylor and in this case, both parties purchased liability and UIM coverage. Due 
to unfortunate circumstances both risks insured against occurred. Consequently, both 
coverages should apply. 
Several states, have analyzed similar issues and support Phillips' request. In 
Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 795 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1990), the plaintiff was seriously 
injured when her husband drove their car off the road. She made claims against both the 
liability and UIM portions of her family's auto policy. Based on the pivotal, prior case of 
Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 655 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1983), the trial court held that, 
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although plaintiff could collect from the liability limits, she could not collect from the 
UIM limits. 
On review, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished Millers and overruled 
the trial court. It noted the plaintiffs in Millers were not members of the insured's family 
and the plaintiffs in Millers were not the purchasers of the UIM insurance. The court 
stated: 
"Where the victim is the purchaser of the UIM policy, however, the 
denial of UIM benefits will thwart the public policy in favor of full 
compensation.... 
...In the present case, Tissell is the purchaser of the UIM policy claimed 
against. Unlike the victims in Millers, she could not have purchased 
UIM coverage elsewhere; this is her UIM policy.... 
...Millers, then, is a limited exception to the policy of full compensation 
for victims. Millers stands only for the rule that a victim who is not the 
insured can be excluded from recovery against the UIM portion of a 
policy where he is compensated by that policy's liability coverage. This 
case, in contrast, demonstrates that such a liability coverage exclusion 
cannot be applied to bar UIM recovery by the purchaser of the policy 
in question." Tissell, 795 P.2d at 128; see also Jain v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 926 P.2d 923 (Wash. 1996) (wherein the Washington 
Supreme Court reiterated its position in Tissell). 
The analysis set forth by Tissell and Jain was followed in Kaiama v. AIG Hawaii 
Ins. Co. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1352 (Hawaii 1997). The Hawaii Supreme Court found that a 
family member/named insured (i.e. a daughter) was entitled to collect from the adverse 
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driver's (i.e. the father's) liability insurance and her family's UIM insurance. The court 
specifically noted: 
Millers upheld the validity of clauses excluding the policyholder's care 
from the definition of underinsured vehicle. However, the injured 
party in Millers was not a named insured as in Tissell but rather was 
an unrelated passenger. This difference is critical.... 
This result is consistent with the scope of UIM coverage to the extent 
UIM is meant to place the injured's insurance carrier in the shoes of 
the underinsured tortfeasor. When the injured is a third party "other 
insured," he or she has no UIM coverage with the driver's insurance 
company. Instead, his or her own carrier should step in. However, 
when the injured is a named insured, her or his carrier is obliged to 
step into the shoes of the insured driver to supplement the coverage. 
Kaiama, 903 P.2d at 1355, citing, Jain, 926 P.2d at 926-27. 
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court followed the same rationale as Tissell 
Jain, and Kaiama. It held, although Class II insureds (i.e. guest passengers) cannot 
combine the liability and UIM limits of the host driver's policy, Mountain States Mutual 
Cas. v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 527 (N.M. 1993), Class I insureds (i.e. named insured 
passengers) can combine both limits. Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 835 (N.M. 
1990). The New Mexico court's reasoning for the different treatment of guest passengers 
versus named insured passengers was: (1) named insured passengers purchase the UIM 
coverage and have a contractual relationship with the UIM carrier while the guest 
passengers do not; (2) UIM coverage follows the insureds, not the vehicles; and (3) the 
guest passengers will recover UIM benefits from the policies on which they are named 
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insureds. Mountain, 848 P.2d at 529. See also State Farm v. Young. 443 S.E.2d 756 
(N.C. 1994) (allowed son of named insured to combine liability and UIM insurance); 
Bratcher v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.. 256 S.E.2d 151 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (allowed 
son of named insured to combine liability and UIM insurance); Holman v. All Nation Ins. 
Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980) (allowed named insured to combine liability and 
UIM insurance). 
In the present case, Charisse Phillips purchased UIM coverage, she has no 
alternative source of UIM coverage, and she has not been fully compensated for her 
injuries. Like the plaintiffs in Taylor. Tissell, Jain. Kaiama. and Padilla. Phillips should 
be able to combine her UIM coverage with the liability coverage that she received. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah has gone to great lengths to adopt a statutory automobile 
insurance scheme that protects innocent victims. By law, insurers must provide 
purchasers the opportunity to buy UIM coverage. This coverage cannot be denied 
purchasers unless it is specifically waived. 
Phillips took advantage of the protection afforded by law and purchased $50,000 
of UIM coverage under her Farmers policy. The coverage was purchased for the express 
purpose of protecting Phillips from the negligence of others. For the reasons set herein, 
this court should overturn the trial court's decision and hold that UIM benefits cannot be 
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denied innocent victims who have legally and lawfully paid for the benefit of UIM 
coverage. 
>V<r 
DATED this ? day of September 2004. 
Law Offices of Kathleen McConkie 
Todd Nilsen 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorneys for Appellant, Charisse Phillips 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
31A-22-305 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or 
owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered 
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section 
31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent 
of the deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is 
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the 
effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
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(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability 
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the extent 
that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association 
or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302 (1) (b) provides 
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from 
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist 
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than 
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under 
Section 31A-22-304. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different 
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the 
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
uninsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage 
in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under 
the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motorist 
coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability 
policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that 
provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a). 
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(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the 
insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability 
insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in the 
business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their 
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by 
purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist 
coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured covered 
person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers1 Compensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person 
has been made whole. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30- 2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show 
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence 
consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the 
highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that 
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
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(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the 
covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the 
other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be 
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections 
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim 
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or 
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes 
uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage 
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered 
person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist benefits 
under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as 
defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not 
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the 
covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a 
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability 
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient 
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and 
general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same 
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
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underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist 
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less 
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or 
more persons in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests 
different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in 
Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator 
of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured 
motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined 
with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the 
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the 
injured person. 
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and when it would be applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the 
insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability 
insurer. 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the 
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the 
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured motorist 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://printwestlaw.com/del^ 9/1/2004 
Page 7 of 11 
UT ST § 31A-22-305 Page 6 
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-22-305 
coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability 
policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by 
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a 
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is 
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. 
Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person injured in a vehicle 
described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect 
to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or 
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (10)(c)(i)(B). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be 
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections 
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person 
has been made whole. 
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered 
person" as defined under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not 
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the 
covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage. 
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(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(b)(i)(B) is entitled to 
the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle 
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered 
person is occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the 
other. 
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections 
if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle 
underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last 
liability policy payment. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 
157; 1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 
1994, ch. 316, § 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 1997, ch. 375, § 14; 
1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, ch. 188, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated 
Subsection (6)(a) and added Subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c); substituted "Subsection 
(6) or (7)" for "Subsection (7)(b),f in the second sentence of Subsection (7)(a); 
added Subsections (10)(b)(ii) through (c)(v) and made related changes; 
redesignated former Subsection (10)(c) as (10)(d) and deleted the first sentence 
authorizing elections of underinsured motorist coverage under specified 
circumstances; and made stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 35A, Chapter 3" 
for "Title 35, Chapter 1" in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) and added "(10)" in Subsections 
(10) (b) (ii) and (10) (c) (iii) . 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapter 2" 
for "Title 35A, Chapter 3" in Subsection (4)(b)((ii). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2) (c), 
redesignating former Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic 
changes in the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e), 
(4)(a)(ii), (4) (c) (ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9) (b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), (10) (c), and 
(11), and made related changes; deleted "For new policies or contracts written 
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote 
Subsection (9) (g) , revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made 
stylistic changes. 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Compiler's Notes. —The phrase "the effective date of this act" in Subsection 
(2) (c) means March 18, 1999, the effective date of Laws 1999, ch. 158, which added 
that subsection. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exclusionary clause. 
Hit and run. 
"Legally entitled to recover." 
Cited. 
Exclusionary clause. 
An exclusionary clause to uninsured motorist coverage is permissible. Former § 
41-12-21.1, which required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage and 
authorized motorists to waive coverage, did not further require insurers to allow 
an individual to purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all the 
other vehicles in his household. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 
1227 (Utah 1987). 
Neither this section nor public policy forbids restrictions on uninsured motorist 
coverage such as an exclusion from coverage of vehicles owned by the insured not 
included in the policy and for which no premiums are paid. Hind v. Quilles, 745 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987). 
A policy that covered the insured for any injury caused by an uninsured motorist 
, excluding therefrom only uninsured "automobiles" owned by the insured, did not 
exclude uninsured motorist coverage when the insured was operating a motorcycle. 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Hit and run. 
Utah law does not require an actual collision to recover under the uninsured 
motorist statute. Marakis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 765 P.2d 882 (Utah 1988) 
(decided under prior law). 
"Legally entitled to recover." 
For an insured to satisfy the "legally entitled to recover" criterion, a viable 
claim that can be reduced to judgment is required. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 
1997). 
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United 
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ADDENDUM - 2 
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379) 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARISSE PHILLIPS. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, : 
Defendant. : 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
FOR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020911489 PI 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
For purposes of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment only, the parties stipulate to the 
following facts: 
1. On or about October 16,2000, on 1-80 near Tooele, Utah, the Plaintiff, Charisse Phillips, was 
riding as a passenger in a 1997 Jeep Cherokee automobile driven by her husband, Bart C. Phillips, when the 
Jeep Cherokee automobile collided with another vehicle and then rolled over. 
2. The accident resulted in injuries to Charisse Phillips, for which Ms. Phillips claims damages 
in excess of $100,000.00. 
3. Charisse Phillips claims that the accident was caused by negligence of her husband, Bart C. 
Phillips in the manner in which he operated the Jeep Cherokee automobile at the time of the accident. 
4. The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of the accident was 
insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. The 
named insured under the policy was Charisse Phillips. 
5. The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy provided automobile liability insurance coverage 
for Bart C. Phillips, with limits of $50,000.00. Farmers Insurance Exchange has paid the limits of 
$50,000.00 to Charisse Phillips, in exchange for a release of all of her claims against Bart. C. Phillips. The 
Release specifically reserves all claims, if any, which Charisse PhilUps may have against Farmers Insurance 
Exchange for underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the accident. 
6. The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy also includes underinsured motorist coverage with 
limits of $50,000.00. The underinsured motorist provisions of the policy include the following: 
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which an insured 
gerson is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator 
of an underinsured motor vehickliecause of bodily injury sustained by the 
j n s m x j i ^ ^ 
Charisse Phillips qualifies as an "insured person", since she is the named insured under the policy. 
7. The underinsured motorist coverage of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy contains the 
following provision: 
4*UinderiB^^^ does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
0 ) furnished OLayailable;for the r e g u l ^ 
family member; 
* * * 
2 
8. The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of the accident was 
the same vehicle which was insured underAe^iabilfe of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy. 
The vehicle also was furnished or available both for the regular use qf f^arisse Phillips and her husband, 
Bart C. Phillips, who is a "family member" under the terms of the Farmers Insurance policy. 
9. Charisse Phillips has made a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under the Farmers 
Insurance Exchange policy. Farmers Insurance Exchange has denied coverage based on the provisions of 
the policy quoted above. 
DATED this / / day of eO J J)f _, 2003. 
/ 
 ;
   c\ 
-r r • 
•KaSUtu^yT? ^~ x^i 
KATHLEEN MCCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
^cs^^f^rA/CJi^^r ./& 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ,*> day oiC^'/Z^/ , 2003,1 caused to be deposited into the U.S. 
Mails, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, addressed to: 
Ms. Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney at Law 
150 North Main, #202 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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ADDENDUM - 3 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379) 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR - h 2004 
SALTt/RtCOUNfV^ '*-'" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARISSE PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020911489 PI 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The motion of Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for summary judgment duly came before 
this Court for hearing on February 23, 2004, at 10:00 a.m.. Prior to the hearing the parties submitted 
memoranda which were reviewed by the Coun. The Court heard arguments by the attorneys for both parties. 
After hearing arguments by the parties and the Court being fully advised, the Court finds that the 
Farmers Insurance Exchange policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for underinsured motorist 
coverage in the following provision: 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy. 
(b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family 
member; . . . 
The provisions of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy are specifically authorized by Utah Code 
97 
Annotated §31A-22-305(8)(b), which provides: 
(b) the term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same 
policy that also contains underinsured motorist coverage; 
(iii) a motor vehicle owned or leased by the named insured, the named 
insured's spouse or any dependent of the named insured. 
These specific provisions of Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-3 05 control over any general provisions 
of the statute and specifically authorize the exclusions under the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy. 
The public policy of the State of Utah is embodied in Utah Code Annotated §31 A-22-3 05(8)(b), 
which specifically authorizes the exclusions in the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy and the exclusions 
in the policy are not contrary to the public policy of the State of Utah. 
Neither the Fanners Insurance Exchange policy nor Utah Code Annotated §31 A-22-305(8)(b) is in 
violation of any of Plaintiffs rights to due process of law under the United States or Utah Constitutions. 
The motion of Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for summary judgment is hereby granted. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the policy issued by Farmers 
Insurance Exchange and Farmers Insurance Exchange is hereby awarded summary judgment on all issues 
raised in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
DATED this J__ day of /tf/Z^t-^^ , ^ 0 4 . 
BY THE COURT 
qtf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the ^ 3 day oiJ^7»A- , 2004,1 caused a true and correct 
J
 — T es-f—• 
copy of the foregoing proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be deposited into the U.S. Mails, postage 
prepaid thereon, addressed to: 
Ms. Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney at Law 
150 North Main, #202 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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